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This paper aims at drawing new guidelines for investigation of monetary hyperinflation analysis. 
We  propose  a  MIUF  optimizing  model  and  show  that  monetary  hyperinflation can  occur as  a 
perfect  foresight  competitive  equilibrium  path  only  when  money  is  essential  in  the  sense  of 
Scheinkman (1980). This result emerges without any ad-hoc assumption implying the inclusion of 
friction  in  the  adjustment  of  some  nominal  variable.  It  suggests  that  monetary  hyperinflation 
analysis  under perfect foresight requires abandoning the Cagan money demand and adopting a 
demand for money respecting money essentiality. 
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1 L’auteur remercie Meixing Dai pour ses remarques intéressantes.   2 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the issue of the replacement of Cagan money demand for the analysis of 
monetary hyperinflation. Cagan money demand is the cornerstone of Cagan’s (1956) model widely 
used in the literature to study hyperinflation both theoretically and empirically. It has been designed 
to explain monetary hyperinflation i.e. speeding up inflation driven by exploding nominal stock of 
money and government needs for seigniorage. Buiter (1987) seriously challenged the model by 
showing  that  under  perfect  foresight  it  was  unable  to  produce  monetary  hyperinflations.  Since 
Kiguel  (1989)  it  is  well  known  in  the  profession  that  Cagan  model  needs  to  combine  rational 
expectations with a partial adjustment mechanism in the monetary market. However, this is very 
unsatisfactory because it is hard to justify the persistent presence of maladjustments costly for the 
agents in a hyperinflationary context. 
 
We  propose  new  guidelines  for  investigation  of  monetary  hyperinflation
2  based  on  a  perfect 
foresight  optimizing  model  with  money-in-the-utility-function  (henceforth  called  MIUF  model) 
drawing on Brock (1975) model. We show that modelling monetary hyperinflation with perfect 
foresight requires that money is essential to the system in the sense of Scheinkman (1980). Cagan 
model can be considered as a special case of the MIUF model but Cagan money demand doesn’t 
satisfy the money essentiality requirement. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the MIUF model and shows that monetary 
dynamics depends on money essentiality; section 3 relates money essentiality to money demand 
inelasticity and shows that modelling monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight requires money 
essentiality; section 4 summarizes the results. 
 
 
2. Monetary dynamics and money essentiality 
 
The optimizing monetary model considered in this paper assumes a continuous time model where 
the economy consists of a large number of identical infinitely-lived forward looking households 
endowed  with  perfect  foresight.  Population  is  constant  and  its  size  is  normalized  to  unity  for 
convenience. There is no uncertainty. Each household has a non-produced constant endowment 
0 y >  of the non-storable consumption good per unit of time. 
 
In the money-in-the-utility-function model the role of money as a medium of exchange is assumed 
to be captured by introducing real money balances into the household utility function. The set up 
draws on Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1975). 
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t t t t t c m y m t p + = - - ￿  .        (2) 
 
                                                
2 Our point should be distinguished from that of other works as Brock (1975), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), Vazquez 
(1998),  Barbosa  and  da  Cunha  (2003),  Gutierrez  and  Vazquez  (2004)  dealing  with  speculative  hyperinflations. 
Speculative hyperinflation, in the terms of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), is a hyperinflation not driven by money growth, 
but a hyperinflationary price level bubble driven by self-fulfilling expectations.   3 
The instantaneous utility function is additive and separable in 
t c , the household’s consumption at 







=  his holdings of real monetary balances, M is the nominal stock of money, P is 
the price level. The functions u and v are increasing in their arguments and strictly concave. d is the 
rate of time preference,  t p the inflation rate, and  t t is a lump-sum tax assumed to be constant. 
 
The first-order condition yields the Euler equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) t t t t t u c c v m u c p d ¢¢ ¢ ¢ = - + + ￿ ,       (3) 
 
The optimum solution must also obey the transversality condition: 
 
( ) lim 0
t
t t t u c e m
d -
®¥
¢ ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ .        (4) 
 
The equilibrium condition in the goods market is 
 
t y c g = + ,            (5) 
 
where g is the constant government expenditure. Using (5) the first-order Euler condition can then 












.          (6) 
 
Condition (6) requires that at each moment the nominal rate of interest i, defined as 
 
 i d p º + ,            (7) 
 
be equal to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for money. The latter Euler equation 
and  the  transversality  condition  (4)  can  be  re-written,  after  normalizing  the  constant  value  of 
( ) u y g ¢ - to unity for convenience, as: 
 




t t e m
d -
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d g m m
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t p = - = = +
￿
￿ .        (10) 
 
Substituting the value of p  extracted from Euler equation in the latter expression leads to: 
 
( ) ( ) m d v m m d ¢ = - - ￿ .        (11) 
   4 
The  differential  equation  (11)  provides  a  complete  characterization  of  real  per-capita  money 
balances  dynamics  which  will  be  studied  by  using  the  technique  of  phase  diagram  on[ [ 0;+¥ . 
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.      (12) 
 
From (12) we see that monetary dynamics analysis requires the distinction of two cases depending 




¢  is zero or strictly positive. The latter distinction is basically a discussion 
about  money  essentiality.  Scheinkman  (1980)  related  the  condition 
0 lim ( ) 0
m mv m
+ ®
¢ >   to  the 
essentiality of money i.e. the fact that “money is very necessary to the system”. The definition of 
money essentiality relates to the evolution of inflation tax collected by government when the rate of 
inflation explodes. Money is considered as essential if the inflation tax collected by the government 
does  not  tend  to  zero  when  the  rate  of  inflation  explodes.  From  (10)  we  see  that  seigniorage 
obtained by printing money can be decomposed into two components, the change in the real stock 
of money and the inflation tax  m p  which can be written, according to Euler equation (8): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) m v m m mv m m p d d ¢ ¢ = - = - .      (13)   
 
Then, when the rate of inflation explodes we have 
 
0 0 lim lim ( )
m m m mv m p
+ + ® ®
¢ = .        (14)   
 
We can conclude that when 
0 lim ( ) 0
m mv m
+ ®
¢ >  then 
0 lim 0
m m p
+ ® >  and money is essential. 
 
 
3. Money essentiality, money demand inelasticity and monetary hyperinflation 
 
Money essentiality is closely related to the inelasticity of the demand for money with respect to the 
cost  of  holding  money.  Euler  equation  (8)  combined  with  nominal  interest  rate  definition  (7) 
implicitly  define  a  demand  for  money  as  a  function  of  the  nominal  interest  rate  i.  The  strict 
concavity of v ensures that m and i are related in a negative fashion. 
 
The function  ( ) s m measuring the cost of money services can be defined according to 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) s m mi m mv m d p ¢ = = + = .        (15) 
 
The first derivative of  ( ) s m is 
1
( ) 1 1
m i
s m i i
i m e
￿ ￿ ¶ ￿ ￿ ¢ = + = - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ¶ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
.      (16) 
 
where e  represents the elasticity of the money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate. If 
the money demand is interest-rate inelastic, 1 e < , then  ( ) 0 s m ¢ < . 
     5 
Since  ( ) 0 s m ³   and  ( ) 0 s m ¢ <   when  the  money  demand  is  inelastic,  it  follows 
that
0 0 lim ( ) lim ( ) 0
m m s m mv m
+ + ® ®
¢ = > .  Thus,  when  money  demand  is  interest  rate-inelastic,  money  is 
essential. 
 
Combining  equations  (11)  and  (15)  the  differential  equation  describing  monetary  dynamics 
becomes 
 
( ) ( ) m d m mv m d m s m d d ¢ = + - = + - ￿ .      (17) 
 
Proposition 1. Monetary hyperinflations can be generated only if money is essential and if the 
maximum  value  of  money  services  is  higher  than  the  real  value  of  government  deficit 
(
0 0 lim ( ) lim ( )
m m mv m s m d
+ + ® ®
¢ = > ). 
 
Proof: A monetary hyperinflation path is represented in the phase diagram by a path converging to 
a zero value of real cash balances. 
 
First step: money is essential 
When
0 lim ( ) 0
m mv m
+ ®
¢ > , limits in (12) become: 
 
0 0 0 0 lim lim ( ) lim ( ) 0 if lim ( )
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m m m m
m
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Therefore,  the  phase  curve  representing  the  dynamics  of  (17)  in  the  phase  diagram  is  strictly 




￿  and going to lim
m m
®+¥ = +¥ ￿ . 
 
Figure 1 represents the phase diagram
3 corresponding to the case
4 when 
0 lim ( )
m s m d




+ ® < ￿ .  As  ( ) 0 s m ¢ < , 
0 lim ( )
m s m d
+ ® >   states  that  the  maximum  value  of  money  services 
(given  by
0 lim ( )
m s m
+ ® )  is  higher  than  the  real  fiscal  deficit.  Since lim
m m
®+¥ = +¥ ￿ ,  the  curve  m ￿   is 
increasing and crossing the horizontal axis only  once at  the  unique steady  state 
* m .  All paths 
originating at the right of m* are hyperdeflationary paths that can be ruled out because violating the 
transversality condition (9). All paths starting to the left of m* are hyperinflationary paths since the 
                                                
3 The precise shape of the phase diagram depends on the second derivative of  m ￿  with respect to m. Then, other shapes 
than that depicted could be possible. However, as we are interested in the qualitative properties of (17) the important 
point is that the phase curve is a strictly increasing one on ] [ 0;¥ . 












= , lead to phase curves entirely above the horizontal axis 
and  imply hyperdeflationary paths that can be ruled out because they violate transversality condition (9).   6 
level of per-capita money balances decreases continuously as time goes by, and then, according to 
(8),  the  inflation  rate  explodes.  Moreover,  these  hyperinflationary  paths  are  monetary 
hyperinflations  because  along  these  paths  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  money  supply  explodes. 





,            (20) 
 we see that along these paths of continuously declining m, given that  0, d > the growth rate of 
money supply increases continuously. 
 
Second step: money is not essential 
When
0 lim ( ) 0
m mv m
+ ®
¢ = , limits in (12) become: 
 
[ ] ( )
[ ]




m d mv m d
m
+ + ® ®
®¥
¢ ￿ = - = > ￿
￿
= +¥ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
.       (21) 
 
According to these limits, whatever the variations of  m ￿  in  ] [ 0;¥ , it is obvious that no monetary 
hyperinflation can be generated since there is no path converging to a zero value of real cash 
balances. This completes the proof.￿ 
 
 
Figure 1: Monetary dynamics when
0 0 lim ( ) lim ( )
m m mv m s m d
® ®
¢ = >  
 
In  the  context  of  speculative  hyperinflations  issue,  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (1983)  ruled  out 
hyperinflationary paths similar graphically to those originating at the left of the steady state on 
Figure 1 on grounds that such paths would not be feasible because the real stock of money would 
eventually become negative. Barbosa and Cunha (2003) contested that approach by arguing that on 
such hyperinflationary paths when the real quantity of money reaches zero hyperinflation would 
have wiped out the value of money, the opportunity cost of holding money would have become 
infinite, and the economy would no longer be a monetary economy. We follow the point made by 
Barbosa and Cunha (2003) and consider the monetary hyperinflation paths of Proposition 1 as 
perfect foresight competitive equilibrium paths. 
 
m ￿  
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-    7 
Proposition 2: Cagan money demand does not comply with money essentiality. 
 
Proof: The Cagan ad-hoc model relying on the Cagan money demand can be considered as a 
special case of the MIUF model developed here. Similarly as Kingston (1982), one can easily verify 
that using a utility function for money services v(m) defined as, 
 
( ) ( )
1 1 log for all 0 v m m m m e
g ad a g ad
- + = + + - < < ,    (22) 
 
in  the  Euler  equation  (8)  will  found  the  famous  semi-logarithmic  Cagan  money  demand 
(logm g ap = -  where g  is a constant and a  a positive constant) and the current MIUF model will 
resume  in  the  inflationary  finance  Cagan  model.  However,  such  a  utility  function  for  money 
services doesn’t comply with money essentiality requirement since for utility function given by (22) 
0 lim ( ) 0
m mv m
+ ®
¢ = .  Then  it  won’t  allow  the  modelling  of  monetary  hyperinflation  as  stated  in 
Proposition 1.￿ 
 
Modelling monetary hyperinflation under perfect foresight requires assuming money essentiality. 
This implies abandoning the Cagan money demand for the analysis of monetary hyperinflation in a 





We consider a MIUF model where money growth relies on the government need for seigniorage 
revenues. Monetary dynamics depend on money essentiality in the sense of Scheinkman (1980). 
Money essentiality is closely associated to the inelasticity of money demand with respect to the cost 
of holding cash balances. The model allows the development of monetary hyperinflations paths 
only when money is essential and the maximum value of money services is higher than the fiscal 
deficit. This suggests that modelling monetary hyperinflation under perfect foresight may require 
firstly money essentiality. This result may give an alternative to the standard Cagan’s model failing 
with perfect foresight. It emerges without any ad-hoc assumption implying the inclusion of some 
friction in the adjustment of some nominal variable. 
 
Cagan ad-hoc model can be considered as a special case of our model. However, Cagan money 
demand doesn’t comply with money essentiality requirement. This issue has a strong empirical 
content.  As  most  of  the  hyperinflation  empirical  investigations  rely  on  the  Cagan  model  with 
rational expectations, it could cast doubt on these empirical studies. The results obtained in this 
paper  suggest  that  monetary  hyperinflation  analysis  with  perfect  foresight  would  require 
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